

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6330

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NDJAMENA 0659

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, UNSC, CD, LY

SUBJ: CHAD, BACKGROUND FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATIONS

REF: STATE 037068

SUMMARY:(U.S. SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF CHADIAN CONFLICT WILL BE APPRECIATED BY CHAD, AND IS WELL-DESERVED. LIBYA HAS MILITARILY OCCUPIED A PART OF CHAD, IS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN OVERTLY SUPPORTING INTERNAL REBELLION, AND IS OBSTRUCTING CHADIAN EFFORTS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. JOM NDJAMENA, SITUATION LGOKS AS FOLLOWS:

1. LIBYAN OCCUPATION OF AOZOU: IN 1973 LIBYAN ARMY PHYSICALLY OCCUPIED CHADIAN TOWN OF AOZOU. SINCE THAT DATE, IT HAS INCORPORATED TOWN AND SURROUNDING AREA INTO LIBYA. DELEGATE FROM AREA SAT AT RECENT LIBYAN GOVERNMENT MEETING IN TRIPOLI.

2. LIBYAN CLAIM TO AREA IS THIN AND SPECIOUS.

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(FRENCH WHITE-PAPER ISSUED LAST YEAR STRONGLY SUPPORTS CHADIANS.) DESPITE THIS, CHADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH LIBYA TO SETTLE THE MATTER. HOWEVER, WITH NEITHER SIDE RECOGNIZING ANY CLAIM TO THE AREA ON THE PART OF THE OTHER, THERE IS ONLY ROOM FOR RETREAT, NOT COMPROMISE. CHAD FEELS SO SURE OF ITS CASE THAT IS HAS CALLED

FOR REFERRAL OF THE ISSUE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE OR SOME SUCH BODY. LIBYA HAS NEVER RESPONDED TO THIS SUGGESTION.

3. CHAD TOOK A COMPLAINT AGAINST LIBYAN AGGRESSION TO THE OAU HEADS OF STATE MEETING IN LIBREVILLE IN JULY 1977. A COMMITTEE WAS APPOINTED BY THE OAU TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER. THAT COMMITTEE HAS CALLED TWO MEETINGS SINCE ITS FORMATION; CHAD HAS ATTENDED BOTH, LIBYA EITHER. THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED A SUB-COMMITTEE TO LOOK INTO THE GEOGRAPHIC AND LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED. THE SUB-COMMITTEE ASKED FOR EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION FROM BOTH PARTIES. CHAD HAS COMPLIED, LIBYA HAS NOT.

4. CHAD'S ONLY FAILURE TO SEIZE A NEGOTIATING OPPORTUNITY CAME WHEN IT WAS HARD PRESSED ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BEING SUBJECTED TO VITUPERATIVE ATTACKS ON THE REBEL RADIO OPERATING FROM TRIPOLI, AND HAD JUST BEEN PUBLICLY INSULTED BY QADHAFI. EVEN WITH ALL THESE NEGATIVE FACTORS, THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL VOTE ON WHETHER FOREIGN MINISTER KAMOUGUE SHOULD MEET LIBYANS IN NIAMEY WAS A CLOSE FIVE TO

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FOUR SPLIT AGAINST HIS PARTICIPATION.

5. SUPPORT FOR REBELS: ALTHOUGH BASIC REBEL MOVEMENT IS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT LIBYA HAS BECOME HEAVILY INVOLVED, AND IS AT PRESENT CALLING THE SHOTS. REBEL LEADER HUOUKOSKI SPENDS FAR MORE TIME IN TRIPOLI THAN IN CHAD. THE LAST TWO MAJOR REBEL OFFENSIVES HAVE BEEN TIMED TO CLOSELY FOLLOW SHAM NEGOTIATING OFFERS BY QADHAFI. THE REBEL RADIO WHICH NOT ONLY BROADCASTS ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROPOGANDA, BUT MILITARY INSTRUCTIONS AS WELL, OPERATES FROM RADIO TRIPOLI.

6. IN ADDITION, LIBYA IS GIVING EXTENSIVE MATERIEL SUPPORT TO THE REBEL CAUSE. REBEL TROOPS HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN LIBYA. REBELS ARE BEING EQUIPPED BY LIBYA. REBEL CASUALTIES ARE BEING HOSPITALIZED IN LIBYA. REBEL OPERATIONS ARE BEING FINANCIALLY SUBSIDIZED BY LIBYA. THE REBEL EQUIPMENT IS BEING TRANSPORTED FROM LIBYA TO CHAD IN LIBYAN TRUCKS.

7. AS YET UNPROVEN, BUT ALLEGED BY CHADIAN

GOVERNMENT, ARE: (A) THE PARTICIPATION OF REGULAR LIBYAN TROOPS IN THE TWO REBEL OFFENSIVES. (FRENCH MILITARY ADVISORS CONFIRM THAT NIGHT FIRING OF REBEL ARTILLERY APPEARS TO BE THE WORK OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS); AND (B) THE USE OF LIBYAN OBSERVATION AND SUPPLY PLANES TO SUPPORT REBEL ATTACK AT FADA. IN ADDITION TO THESE GOVERNMENT CHARGES, TROOPS RETURNING FROM THE RECENT FIGHTING IN THE NORTH HAVE REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF WHITES AMONG THE ATTACKERS, AND THE USE OF SPAPUSH OVER REBEL FIELD RADIOS. (EMBASSY CAN CONFIRM NEITHER OF THESE AT THIS TIME.)

8. OBSTRUCTION OF ADJUDICATORY EFFORTS AT NATIONAL
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RECONCILIATION: SINCE IT CAME TO POWER IN APRIL 1975, THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL HAD ACTIVELY PURSUED A COURSE OF NEGOTIATION WITH THE VARIOUS REBEL MOVEMENTS AIMED AT ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. YA THIS COURSE STARTED OUT WELL WITH SEVERAL REBEL BANDS RALLYING TO THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, BY EARLY 1977, REBELS HAD COALESCED INTO FOUR MAJOR GROUPS: THE GOUKOUNI GROUP IN THE NORTH; THE EL BAGLANI GROUP IN THE EAST; THE ABBA SIDDICK GROUP ABROAD, WITH A FEW ARAB FIGHTERS IN THE EAST; AND THE HISEN HABRE GROUP (WHICH HAD SPLINTERED OFF FROM GOUKOUNI) IN THE EAST CENTRAL PORTION. NONE OF THESE GROUPS SEEMED TO BE INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND REBELLION WAS STALEMATED. HOWEVER, WITH THUMORE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF LIBYA, NEGOTIATIONS WERE RESUMED WITH SOME GROUPS (MOST REBELS ARE OPPOSED TO LIBYAN TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, AND EVEN GOUKOUNI IS UNEASY WITH LIBYAN BACKING).

9. AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND HPD EN HABRE IN FEBRUARY 1978, AND A SIMILAR AGREEMENT IS ABOUT TO BE SIGNED WITH ABBA SIDDICK. (ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE NOTED THE LARGEST PART OF ABBA SIDDICK'S FIELD FORCE HAS SPLIT OFF AND JOINED GOUKOUNI.) THE EL BAGLANI FACTION HAS BEEN BADLY SPLIT SINCE THE MYSTERIOUS DEATH OF EL BAGLANI IN A

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QUOTE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT UNQUOTE IN TRIPOLI. PART OF IT HAS JOINED HISSEN HABRE IN RETURNING TO THE FOLD; PART HAS JOINED GOUKOUNI IN THE FIELD; AND A PART IS SITTING OUT THIS ROUND. GOUKOUNI HAS ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT MALLOUM'S MOST RECENT CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE AND FOR A STATEMENT BY ALL THE REBELS ON THEIR CONDITIONS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION HAS, TO DATE, BEEN IGNORED BY GOUKOUNI, WHO IS NOW SO CLOSELY TIED TO LIBYA THAT HE IS NO LONGER A FREE AGENT.

10. COMMENT: WHILE THE CHADIANS ARE NOT PERFECT, THEY ARE CLEARLY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THE CASE AT HAND. THEY ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE, NOT ONLY OUT OF CONVICTION, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE BEING WHIPPED IN THE NORTH. A GENERAL AMNESTY FOR REBELS HAS ALREADY BEEN ANNOUNCED AS PART OF THE HISSEN HABRE AGREEMENT. SOME SORT OF REFERRAL OF THE LIBYAN/CHADIAN BORDER DISPUTE TO A JUDICIAL BODY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO CHAD, REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR THE NORTH COULD PROBABLY BE SWALLOWED, AND
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PARTICIPATION BY REBEL LEADERS IN SOME NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT COULD BEARRANGED. HOWEVER, FORHBTS PART, CHAD WOULD EXPECT SOME SORT OF GUARANTEE THAT LIBYA WOULD STOP TRYING TO SUBVERT CH.'S GOVRNMEFVSAND REPLACE IT WITH SOMETHING MORE AKIN TO TRIPOLI'S.

11. GOVERNMENT EMERGING FROM FOREGOING ARRANGEMENTS
WOULD BE WEAK AND DIVIDED. REAL POWER WOULD STILL REST
WITH ARMY, AND EVEN IF LATTER WERE WATERED DOWN BY INCLUSION
OF REBEL ELEMENTS, IT WOULD STILL TEND TO BE SOUTHERN
DOMINATED. ONLY IF LEADERSHIP OF ARMY WERE
WED TO THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL RECONCIL-
IATION (AS ARE MALLOUM AND DJIME) WOULD IT BE ABLE TO
RESIST TAKING OVER DIRECTVQN OF AFFAIRS.BRADFORD

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